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NOTES
THE 1978 PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT: A
PROBLEM OF INTERPRETATION
In late 1978 Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,
adding section 701(k) to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2
This legislation climaxed a long period of judicial juggling, including
three United States Supreme Court decisions, with the problem of dif-
ferential treatment of pregnant employees. To the extent that the act
quelled this turbulent area of law and improved the lot of pregnant
workers, the amendment to Title VII was welcome and necessary. As
this Note will demonstrate, however, the drafters of the 1978 amend-
ment, and the Congress that enacted it, failed to foresee that the man-
date of section 701(k) contradicts, in some instances, that of Section 703
of Title VII. The law regarding pregnancy based discrimination, there-
fore, remains unsettled and uncertain.
I. THE BACKGROUND
Commentators have extensively surveyed the cases that decided
claims of pregnancy based discrimination prior to the 1978 Pregnancy
Discrimination Act.3 A review of these decisions is necessary, however,
1, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-(k) (1976 & Supp. 1 1978)). This section provides as follows:
The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions; and
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated
the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe
benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability
to work, and nothing in section 703(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit other-
wise. This subsection shall not require an employer to pay for health insurance benefits
for abortion, except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were
carried to term, or except where medical complications have arisen from an abortion:
Provided, That nothing herein shall preclude an employer from providing abortion ben-
efits or otherwise affect bargaining agreements in regard to abortion.
(emphasis in original).
2, 42 US.C. § 2000 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
3 See generally Barkett, Pregnancy Discrimination-Purpose, Effect, and Nashville Gas Co.
v Satty. 16 J. FAM. L. 401 (1978); Ginsburg, Gender andthe Constitution, 44 CIN. L. REv. 1 (1975);
Note, The Irrational Trend Toward Mandatory Maternity Coverage, 26 DRAKE L. REV. 758 (1977);
Note, Title VII, Pregnancy and Disability Payments: Women and Children Last, 44 GEO. WASH. L.
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to appreciate the "state of national confusion ' 4 that Congress intended
to eliminate by enacting the 1978 amendment to Title VII. The tor-
tured evolution of this area of law may be classified into distinct stages
delineated by three Supreme Court decisions. The lower federal and
state courts generally sought to minimize the impact of these decisions,
but in Congress alone lay the power to correct the disorder. The con-
gressional exercise of that power, however, left still more confusion.
Constitutional challenges to pregnancy based discrimination had
only short lived success in the Supreme Court.' In 1974 the Supreme
Court in Cleveland Board of Education v. Lafleur6 held that school
board policies requiring pregnant teachers to take maternity leave four
and five months before the expected delivery dates violated the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause. In that same year, however,
the Court in Geduldig v. Aiello8 held that California's exclusion of ben-
efits for normal pregnancy from its disability insurance plan did not
violate the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. Private
employees received benefits under the plan for temporary disabilities
other than normal pregnancy that were not covered by workmen's
compensation.9 The Court, in an opinion by Justice Stewart,' 0 found
no evidence that the selection of insured risks discriminated against
REV. 381 (1976); Note, Gender-Based Discrimination After Gilbert and Satty, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAC.
& PROC. 459 (1979); 28 S.C. L. REV. 219 (1976).
4. H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 3 (1978), reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE Cowo.
& AD. NEWS 4749.
5. For a comprehensive review of the Supreme Court's treatment of constitutional chal-
lenges to sex discrimination, see generally Ginsburg, Sex Equality andthe Constitution, 52 TUL. L.
REV. 451 (1978). See also Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights
Amendments, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 161.
6. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
7. Id. at 651. The Court also overturned Cleveland's policy prohibiting the teachers from
returning to work until three months after delivery. Id. at 650. Both policies, in the Court's view,
created unwarranted "irrebuttable" presumptions against the teachers' capacity to work that vio-
lated due process. See 414 U.S. at 649, 651. On the "irrebuttable presumption" doctrine, see
Dixon, The Supreme Court and Equality: Legislative Classiications, Desegregation, and Reverse
Discrimination, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 494, 514-25 (1977). See also Note, Pregnancy and the Consti-
tution: The Uniqueness Trap, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1532, 1544-47 (1974).
8. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
9. Id. at 486. Under the California plan, disabilities of less than eight days' duration were
not compensable unless the employee was hospitalized; furthermore, no benefits were payable for
any one disability beyond twenty-six weeks. Id. at 488. The plan also excluded disabilities result-
ing froin court commitment as a dipsomaniac, drug addict, or sexual psychopath. Id. The
Supreme Court in Geduldig had only to consider the exclusion of normal pregnancy from cover-
age under the plan. Prior to the district court's decision in the case, a California appellate court
had ruled that the plan did not bar benefit payments for disabilities resulting from abnormal
[Vol. 58:607
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any definable group in terms of the "aggregate risk protection" derived
from the program." The Court upheld that selection as "objective and
wholly non-invidious" and as justified by the state's legitimate inter-
ests.12
The Court, in a significant footnote, sought to distinguish pregnancy-
based classifications from sex discrimination-a distinction which it
amplified two years later in General Electric Company v. Gilbert'3 and
which Congress expressly repudiated in 1978.1 The Court first de-
clared the Geduldig case to be a "far cry" from two early sex discrimi-
nation cases-Reed v. Reed 5 and Frontiero v. Richardson16-in that
these cases involved "discrimination based upon gender as such."' 7
pregnancy. Rentzer v. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., 32 Cal. App. 3d 604, 108 Cal. Rptr. 336
(1973). See 417 U.S. at 490.
10. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist joined in the
opinion of the Court. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Douglas and
Marshall joined. See note 17 infra.
11. 417 U.S. at 496. The Court continued: "There is no risk from which men are protected
and women are not. Likewise, there is no risk from which women are protected and men are not."
Id. at 496-97.
Two years after Geduldig, Justice Stevens responded to this argument as follows:
If the word "risk" is used narrowly, men are protected against the risks associated with
a prostate operation whereas women are not. If the word is used more broadly to de-
scribe the risk of uncompensated unemployment caused by physical disability, men re-
ceive total protection (subject to the 60% and 26-week limitations) against that risk
whereas women receive only partial protection.
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 162 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
12. 417 U.S. at 496. The Court found legitimate state interests in maintaining the self-sup-
porting nature of the program, in keeping benefit payments at an adequate level, and in maintain-
ing a contribution rate which was not unduly burdensome. Id.
13. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). See notes 42-51 infra and accompanying text.
14. See notes 108-116 infra and accompanying text.
15. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In Reed the Court overturned an Idaho statute which gave preference
to males in appointments as administrators of estates though female applicants were equally qual-
ified. Id. at 72-73. The Court held that administrative convenience could not justify Idaho's
denial of equal protection to women. Id. at 74.
16. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). In Frontiero the Court invalidated, again on equal protection
grounds, federal statutes which required female members of the Armed Services, but not male
members, to prove the dependency of their spouses in order to receive increased housing and
health care benefits. Four Justices, in a plurality opinion, viewed sex as a "suspect" class, but this
view has yet to draw majority support in the Court. See Ginsburg, Sex Equali y and the Constitu-
tion, supra note 5, at 463.
17. 417 U.S. at 496 n.20. This footnote begins, "The dissenting opinion to the contrary
." In the dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, disputed the
majority's use of a "rational basis" standard in evaluating the California program and argued that
Reed and Frontiero mandated "a stricter standard of scrutiny which the State's classification fails
to satisfy .. " 417 U.S. at 498. The Geduldig dissenters found the "'invidious distinctions'" of
the program unjustified by California's interest "in preserving the fiscal integrity of its disability
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The Court reasoned that the California plan excluded no one from cov-
erage because of gender, but "merely remove[d] one physical condi-
tion-pregnancy-from the list of compensable disabilities."' 8 The
Geduldig Court conceded that pregnancy is unique to women, but de-
nied that every pregnancy based classification is therefore a sex based
classification.' 9 The California program, the Court explained, simply
divided potential recipients of disability benefits "into two groups-
pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is
exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes."20 The
Court concluded that the benefits of the program thus accrued to mem-
bers of both sexes2' and therefore found no invidious discrimination.22
The Court thereby closed the federal constitutional avenue to challeng-
ing this type of pregnancy based classification.
The lower federal courts quickly deadened Geduldig's impact by dis-
tinguishing its facts and the constitutional claim involved.23 The courts
of appeals, continuing a trend in the district courts,24 agreed that the
insurance program," which interest, moreover, "could easily have been achieved through a variety
of less drastic, sexually neutral means." Id. at 504-05.
18. 417 U.S. at 496 n.20.
19. While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that every
legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification like those con-
sidered in Reed. . .and Frontiero. . . . Normal pregnancy is an objectively identifi-
able physical condition with unique characteristics. Absent a showing that distinctions
involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination
against the members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to in-
clude or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as this on any reason-
able basis, just as with respect to any other physical condition.
417 U.S. at 496 n.20.
20. Id. Justice Stevens, in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), disputed the
accuracy of this reasoning: "Insurance programs, company policies, and employment contracts all
deal with future risks rather than historic facts. The classification is between persons who face a
risk of pregnancy and those who do not." Id. at 161-62 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).
21. 417 U.S. at 496 n.20.
22. Id. at 494, 496.
23. See generally 28 S.C. L. REv. 219, 224-31 (1976).
24. See Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 661
(4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego School Dist, No. 7, 374 F.
Supp. 1056 (D. Or. 1974), modifled, 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1037
(1976), vacated, 558 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1977); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146
(W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated, 424 U.S. 737 (1975), cer. denied, 429
U.S. 1000 (1976); Dessenberg v. American Metal Forming Co., 8 F.E.P. 290 (N.D. Ohio 1973);
Farkas v. South Western City School Dist., 8 F.E.P. 288 (S.D. Ohio 1974), aft'd, 506 F.2d 1400
(6th Cir. 1975). Contra, Newmon v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 238 (N.D. Ga. 1973)
(pregnancy neither a sickness nor a disability, therefore denial of benefits did not violate Title
VII). See generally Barkett, supra note 3, at 413-33.
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exclusion of pregnancy related disabilities violated Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act.25 The opinions typically reasoned that Geduldig,
decided on equal protection grounds, was inapposite to a Title VII ac-
tion 2  and stressed the unusual facts of the Geduldig case.27 Further-
more, although the Supreme Court in footnote 20 of the Geduldig
opinion denied that pregnancy based classifications are gender based
classifications,2  several courts of appeals viewed that footnote as like-
wise inapplicable to Title VII claims.29 Finally, the intermediate courts
showed great deference to the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) guidelines on employment policies relating to
pregnancy and childbirth. 30  The EEOC, in its guidelines, interpreted
Title VII as requiring the inclusion of pregnancy related disabilities in
disability and health insurance plans "on the same terms and condi-
tions as. . . other temporary disabilities."'" Despite Geduldig's admo-
25. Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975), rev'd in part, 434 U.S. 136
(1978); Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego School Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1037 (1976), vacated, 558 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1977); Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519
F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Communications Workers of America v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d
199 (3d Cir.), vacated, 424 U.S. 737 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976). See also Holthaus
v. Compton & Sons, Inc., 514 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1975).
26. See Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661, 666 (4th Cir. 1975), rel'd, 429 U.S. 125
(1976); Communications Workers of America v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024, 1031
(2d Cir. 1975); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 203 (3d Cir.), vacated, 424 U.S. 737
(1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976).
27. Gedudig involved a state created disability plan that excluded coverage of only normal
pregnancies. See note 9 supra. Some courts of appeals found that plan significantly different from
private employment disability plans excluding disabilities from all pregnancies, normal or not.
See Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661, 666 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 125 (1976);
Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 203 (3d Cir.), vacated, 424 U.S. 737 (1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976).
28. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
29. The Second Circuit concluded that footnote 20 of Geduldig dealt with "the constitutional
validity of legislative classifications under the Equal Protection Clause, the standards of judicial
scrutiny to be applied in making such a determination, and nothing more." Communications
Workers of America v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024, 1030 (2d Cir. 1975). Accord,
Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661, 666-67 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). The
court in Communications Workers noted that footnote 20, like "other 'marginalia' in Supreme
Court opinions. . . should be read 'within the context of the holding of the court and the text to
which it is appended'...." 513 F.2d at 1028, quoting Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. School Dist.,
427 F.2d 319, 322 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971).
30. See cases cited in Note, Title VII, Pregnancy and Disability Payments, supra note 3, at 390
n.53.
31. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1975). The EEOC issued its guidelines on employment policies
relating to pregnancy and childbirth on March 31, 1972 (effective April 5, 1972), as an amendment
to its Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex. See 37 Fed. Reg. 6836 (1972); 29 C.F.R.
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nition that excluding pregnancy related disabilitites is not sex
discrimination, the courts of appeals agreed with the EEOC in its inter-
pretation of Title VII.
In General Electric Company v. Gilbert,32 the Supreme Court ab-
ruptly ended this line of cases by ruling that the Fourth Circuit had
been "wrong in concluding that the reasoning of Geduldig was not ap-
plicable to an action under Title VII."33 The Court held Geduldig was
"precisely in point in its holding that an exclusion of pregnancy from a
disability-benefits plan providing general coverage is not a gender-
based discrimination at all." 34
In Gilbert, a Title VII class action, the Supreme Court upheld Gen-
eral Electric's disability plan that provided benefits for nonoccupa-
tional sickness and accidents but excluded pregnancy related
disabilities.35 The district court had found this exclusion to be sex dis-
crimination in violation of Title VII,36 and the court of appeals had
affirmed, limiting the intervening Geduld'g decision to its fourteenth
§ 1604.10 (1972). The 1972 pregnancy guidelines signaled a reversal of the EEOC's position with
regard to the exclusion of pregnancy benefits from disability and health insurance plans. See note
55 infra. The full text of these guidelines follows:
(a) A written or unwritten employment policy or practice which excludes from em-
ployment applicants or employees because of pregnancy is in prima facie violation of
Title VII.
(b) Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, child-
birth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes, temporary disabilities and
should be treated as such under any health or temporary disability insurance or sick
leave plan available in connection with employment. Written and unwritten employ-
ment policies and practices involving matters such as the commencement and duration
of leave, the availability of extensions, the accrual of seniority and other benefits and
privileges, reinstatement, and payment under any health or temporary disability insur-
ance or sick leave plan, formal or informal, shall be applied to disability due to preg-
nancy or childbirth on the same terms and conditions as they are applied to other
temporary disabilities.
(c) Where the termination of an employee who is temporarily disabled is caused by
an employment policy under which insufficient or no leave is available, such a termina-
tion violates the act if it has a disparate impact on employees of one sex and is not
justified by business necessity.
32. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
33. Id. at 136. For a comprehensive discussion and analysis of Gilbert, see Barkett, supra
note 3, at 433-57.
34. 429 U.S. at 136.
35. Id. at 128-29. In addition, General Electric's plan excluded coverage for disabilities not
related to pregnancy if they arose during the employee's pregnancy leave. Thus, General Electric
had denied an individual in the plaintiffs' class benefits for a pulmonary embolism which, though
not related to her pregnancy, occurred during her pregnancy leave. Id. at 129 n.4.
36. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 385-86 (E.D. Va. 1974), afJ'd, 519 F.2d
661 (4th Cir. 1975), rey'd, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
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amendment context.3 7 The Supreme Court in Gilbert, however, made
clear that its analysis in Geduldig was not so narrow.
The Gilbert Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist,3 8 considered
whether the concept of discrimination is the same under section
703(a)(1) of Title VI1 9 as under the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause. The Court first noted that Congress failed to define
"discrimination" in Title VII. Justice Rehnquist then reasoned that the
law analyzing "discrimination" in equal protection cases was devel-
oped to alleviate concerns similar to Congress' concerns when it en-
acted Title VII.1 Consequently, the Court reasoned, Geduldig was a
useful starting point in determining whether a pregnancy exclusion
similar to General Electric's plan in fact discriminates on the basis of
sex." Justice Rehnquist then reviewed the earlier decision, quoting
footnote 2042 of Geduldig in its entirety. This language, according to
the Court, clearly indicated the basis of Geduldig: the exclusion of
pregnancy from California's disability plan "was not in itself discrimi-
nation based on sex."'43 A final premise-that General Electric's disa-
bility plan was "strikingly similar" to California's plan4--completed
37. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661, 666-67 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 125
(1976). See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text.
38. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, and Powell joined in the opinion. Jus-
tice Blackmun concurred in part. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1976). Section 703(a)(1) declares it an unlawful employment
practice for an employer "to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; .... " For the full text of section 703(a) of Title VII, see note 186 infra.
40. 429 U.S. at 133.
41. Id. Justice Stevens, in dissent, rejected this reasoning with the observation that "when it
enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress could not possibly have relied on
language which this Court was to use a decade later in the Geduldig opinion." Id. at 161. In a
footnote to this passage, Justice Stevens further observed that neither could Congress have in-
tended to adopt the Supreme Court's analysis of sex discrimination, "because it was seven years
after the statute was passed that the Court first intimated that the concept of sex discrimination
might have some relevance to equal protection analysis. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)."
Id. at 161 n.3.
Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion in which Justice Marshall concurred, also regarded as
"unacceptable" the Court's "implication ... that the Fourteenth Amendment standard of dis-
crimination is coterminous with that applicable to Title VII." Id. at 153 n.6. The Court's "fleeting
dictum," in Justice Brennan's view, was "irrelevant to the reasoning that precedes it, . . . [in]
conflict with a long line of cases to the contrary .... [and] flatly contradicted by the central
holding of last Term's Warkingion v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).... Id.
42. See notes 15-22 supra and accompanying text.
43. 429 U.S. at 135.
44. Id. at 133.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the syllogism: General Electric's exclusion of pregnancy benefits was
not "in itself' sex discrimination under Title VII.
The Court recognized in Gilbert, as it had in Geduldig,45 that its con-
clusion required qualification because of the rule that one can at times
establish a prima facie violation of Title VII by showing that the effect
of an otherwise facially neutral classification is to discriminate against
members of a class.46 Justice Rehnquist, reaffirming Geduldig's focus
on the "aggregate risk protection" provided by the disability plan,47
observed that General Electric's package covered the same categories
of risk and was, therefore, facially nondiscriminatory. 48 Because there
was no proof that the package was worth more to men than to women,
General Electric's disability plan had no gender based discriminatory
effect.49 Because the plan was less than all inclusive did not, without
more, produce a discriminatory effect." Pregnancy related disabilities,
the Court concluded, "constitute an additional risk, unique to women,
45. We recognized in Geduldig, of course, that the fact that there was no sex-based dis-
crimination as such was not the end of the analysis, should it be shown "that distinctions
involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination
against the members of one sex or the other," [quoting 417 U.S. at 496 n.20]. But we
noted that no semblance of such a showing had been made .... [quote from 417 U.S.
at 496-97 omitted.]
Id at 135. See note II supra for portion of opinion quoted in Gilbert but omitted here.
46. Id. at 137, citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-48 (1976). The Court also cited
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971), as an application of the "effect" test to a
facially neutral employment exam challenged under § 703(a)(2) of Title VII. (For text of
§ 703(a)(2), see note 186 infra.) The Court then continued: "Even assuming that it is not neces-
sary in this case to prove intent to establish a prima facie violation of § 703(a)(1), but cf. McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-06 (1973), the respondents have not made the
requisite showing of gender-based effects." 429 U.S. at 137 (footnote omitted).
The Court's "but cf." citation to McDonneil Douglas prompted varied reactions from several
Justices. Justice Brennan termed the citation "cryptic" and "mystifying," because, in his view, the
Court in McDonnell Douglas "expressly held that a prima facie violation of Title VII could be
proved without affirmatively demonstrating that purposeful discrimination had occurred." Id. at
153 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Apparently as a result of the citation to McDonnell Douglas,
Justice Blackmun concurred in the Court's opinion only in part. He refused to join "any inference
or suggestion in the Court's opinion-if any such inference or suggestion is there---that effect may
never be a controlling factor in a Title VII case, or that Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971), is no longer good law." Id. at 146 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part). Justice Stewart, in a
brief concurring opinion, replied that "[u]nlike my Brother Blackmun, I do not understand the
opinion to question either Griggs v. Duke Power Co... . specifically, or the significance generally
of proving discriminatory effect in a Title VII case." Id.
47. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 (1974). See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
48. 429 U.S. at 138.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 138-39.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss3/8
Number 3] PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION
and the failure to compensate them for this risk does not destroy the
presumed parity of the benefits, accruing to men and women alike,
which results from the facially evenhanded inclusion of risks."" t
In the final section of its opinion in Gilbert, the Court considered the
deference due the EEOC guidelines on pregnancy related employment
policies.52 Justice Rehnquist found the EEOC's position unpersuasive
on several grounds: Congress had conferred only limited authority on
the EEOC to promulgate regulations;53 the agency's guidelines were
not a contemporaneous interpretation of Title VII;54 the guidelines
51. Id. at 139 (emphasis in original). Justice Brennan viewed the Court's "underinclusive"
analysis as particularly deserving of reproach. describing the argument as "simplistic and mislead-
ing" and of transparent "shallowness." Id. at 152 & n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He sought to
discredit the Court's analysis through extrapolation:
Had General Electric assembled a catalogue of all ailments that befall humanity, and
then systematically proceeded to exclude from coverage erery' disability that is female-
specific or predominantly afflicts women, the Court could still reason as here that the
plan operates equally: Women, like men, would be entitled to draw disability payments
for their circumcisions and prostatectomies, and neither sex could claim payments for
pregnancies, breast cancer, and the other female-dominated disabilities. Along similar
lines, any disability that occurs disproportionately in a particular group-sickle-cell ane-
mia. for example--could be freely excluded from the plan without troubling the Court's
analytical approach.
Id. at 152 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
52. See notes 30-31 supra and accompanying text. The Court in Gilbert discussed only sub-
section (b) of 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1975). 429 U.S. at 140-41. See note 31 supra.
53. 429 U.S. at 141. The Court observed that "Congress, in enacting Title VII, did not confer
upon the EEOC authority to promulgate rules or regulations pursuant to that Title." Id. Indeed,
in § 713(a) of Title VII, Congress gave the agency only the authority to "issue, amend, or rescind
suitable procedural regulations to carry out the provisions of this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
12(a) (1976). No one contended in Gilbert, according to the Court, that the pregnancy guideline
involved was either "procedural m nature or in effect." 429 U.S. at 141 n.20.
Nevertheless. Congress tacitly acknowledged in § 713(b) of Title VII that the EEOC could issue
"written interpretation[s] or opinion[s]." for it provided that good faith conformity with and reli-
ance upon on EEOC interpretation or opinion was a defense to liability under Title VII. Congress
also, however, recognized that a judicial authority could determine the interpretation or opinion
"to be invalid or of no legal effect .... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b) (1976).
Precisely because the guidelines on employment policies related to pregnancy and childbirth are
"interpretive in nature," the EEOC concluded that the Administrative Procedure Act's require-
ments of "notice of proposed rule making, opportunity for public participation, and delay in the
effective date are inapplicable." 37 Fed. Reg. 6836 (1972); see also Administrative Procedure Act
§ 4. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1976). The EEOC, in addition to holding no public hearings before
issuing the pregnancy guidelines, conducted neither medical studies on pregnancy nor financial
studies on the anticipated monetary impact of the guidelines. See Note, Current Trends in Preg-
nancy Beneflts-1972 EEOC Guidelines Interpreted, 24 DEPAUL L. REv. 127, 130 (1974). Al-
though the Court in Gilbert did not advert to these facts, the lack of public response and empirical
data concerning the EEOC guidelines do not attest to their meriting "great deference" by the
courts.
54. 429 U.S. at 142. The EEOC issued its guidelines on employment practices relating to
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contradicted earlier enunciations by the EEOC;55 and the EEOC's posi-
tion was "diametrically oppos[ed]" to the Wage and Hour Administra-
tor's interpretation of the Equal Pay Act.5 6 The Court thus rejected the
pregnancy and childbirth in 1972, eight years after Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. See note 31 supra.
55. 429 U.S. at 142-43. In late 1966 the General Counsel of the EEOC issued opinion letters
stating the EEOC position to be that "an insurance or other benefit plan may simply exclude
maternity as a covered risk, and such exclusion would not ... be discriminatory." General
Counsel Opinion Letter, Nov. 10, 1966. E.P.G. (CCH) 17,304.49. The EEOC based its refusal at
that time "to compare an employer's treatment of illness or injury with his treatment of mater-
nity" upon the view that "maternity is a temporary disability unique to the female sex and more
or less to be anticipated during the working life of most woman employees." Id. The EEOC
affirmed this position in a 1969 decision, [1973] EEOC DEc. (CCH) 6084 (Dec. No. 70-360
(1969)), but then summarily reversed itself fifteen months later, [1973] EEOC DEC. (CCH) 6221
(Dec. No. 71-1474 (1971)). The pregnancy guidelines followed a year later. See Note, Current
Trends in Pregnancy Benefits, note 53 supra, at 129-30.
Justice Brennan, dissenting in Gilbert, found "bitter irony" in the Court's reasoning in that:
the care that preceded promulgation of the 1972 guideline is today condemned by the
Court as tardy indecisiveness, its unwillingness irresponsibly to challenge employers'
practices during the formative period is labeled as evidence of inconsistency, and this
indecisiveness and inconsistency are boot-strapped into reasons for denying the Com-
mission's interpretation its due deference.
429 U.S. at 157 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In light of the absence of hard studies and solicitation of
public response by the EEOC prior to issuing the guidelines, see note 53 supra, and the analysis
upon which the EEOC based its earlier position, Justice Brennan's conclusion that "the 1972
guideline represents a particularly conscientious and reasonable product of EEOC deliberations,"
429 U.S. at 157 (Brennan, J., dissenting), is of doubtful accuracy.
56. 429 U.S. at 144-45. The Wage and Hour Administrator had determined that it is not a
violation of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976), "[i]f employer contributions to a plan
providing insurance or similar benefits to employees are equal for both men and women. . . even
though the benefits which accrue to the employees in question are greater for one sex than for the
other." 29 C.F.R. § 800.116(d) (1980). Section 703(h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)
(1976)-the "Bennett Amendment"-provides that it is not an unlawful employment practice for
an employer to differentiate on the basis of sex for determining the compensation of its employees
if such differentiation is authorized by the Equal Pay Act. Therefore, the Court reasoned, the
Wage and Hour Administrator's interpretation of the Equal Pay Act was, by virtue of § 703(h),
applicable to Title VII as well. 429 U.S. at 144. The Court concluded that, if it were to accept the
EEOC position, "[p]etitioner's exclusion of benefits for pregnancy disability would be declared an
unlawful employment practice under § 703(a)(1), but would be declared not to be an unlawful
employment practice under § 703(h)." Id. at 145.
When Congress enacted the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, see note 109 infra, it expressly
repudiated this reasoning by the Court. Section 701(k) accomplishes this by first mandating that
women affected by pregnancy or related medical conditions be treated the same as other employ-
ees not so affected but similarly disabled; the section then provides that "nothing in section 703(h)
shall be interpreted to permit otherwise." See note I supra. The purpose of the disclaimer, ac-
cording to the Senate committee report on the amendment, was to make clear that "any applica-
tion of the Bennett amendment which assumes that the provision insulates from Title VII all
compensation and fringe benefit programs which do not also violate the Equal Pay Act is not
correct," and to ensure that "employers may not rely on the Equal Pay Act to prevent the correc-
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EEOC pregnancy guidelines as standing virtually alone and followed
instead what it perceived to be the plain meaning of section 703(a)(1).11
After Gilbert, lower federal courts upheld,58 often summarily,59 the
exclusion of pregnancy benefits from disability plans similar to General
Electric's. These courts did not always agree on the extension of Gil-
bert to other areas of alleged pregnancy discrimination 60 or on the pos-
sibility of showing a violation of Title VII by proof of a discriminatory
effect on women.61 For the most part, however, the federal courts ac-
cepted the Gilbert decision rather than attempting to distinguish it as
they had Geduldig.62
State courts, on the contrary, overwhelmingly rejected the result in
Gilbert. As one commentator observed, "the ink was hardly dry on
Gilbert when the Court of Appeals of New York refused to follow it. ' '63
Courts in Illinois,64 Massachusetts, 65 Iowa,66 New Jersey,67 Penn-
tion of pregnancy discrimination under Title VII." S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1977).
See also H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 4, at 7.
57. 429 U.S. at 145.
58. See, e.g., Eberts v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 581 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1978); Women in
City Government United v. City of New York, 563 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1977); Guse v. J.C. Penney
Co., 562 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1977). See generally Barkett, SUpra note 1, at 461-64.
59. See, e.g., Liss v. School Dist. of Ladue, 548 F.2d 751 (8th Cir. 1977); Madrid v. Board of
Educ. of Gilroy Unified School Dist., 429 F. Supp. 816 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Willett v. Emory &
Henry College, 427 F. Supp. 631 (W.D. Va. 1977), aff'd, 569 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1978); Tawney v.
Board of Educ. of Boone, 426 F. Supp. 528 (S.D. W. Va. 1977).
60. Compare Mitchell v. Board of Trustees of Pickens County School Dist. A, 15 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 338 (D.S.C. 1977) (in light of Gilbert, defendants' policy of not renewing pregnant
teachers' contracts did not constitute sex discrimination) with Jacobs v. Martin Sweets Co., 550
F.2d 364 (6th Cir.). cert. denied, 431 U.S. 917 (1977) (Gilbert holding is not precedent for exclud-
ing pregnancy from protection against invidious employment termination).
61. Compare Women in City Government United v. City of New York, 563 F.2d 537, 540-41
(2d Cir. 1977) (Gilbert bars plaintiffs from establishing discrimination through proof of disparate
impact) with In re National Airlines, Inc.. 434 F. Supp. 249, 256 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (after Gilbert,
plaintiffs may still show gender based effect of pregnancy policy under Title VII).
62. See cases cited in I A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, 8-23 n.57 (1979).
63. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 62, at 8-61 to 8-62. The case referred to is Brooklyn Union Gas
Co. v. New York State Human Rights App. Bd., 41 N.Y.2d 84, 359 N.E.2d 393, 390 N.Y.S.2d 884
(1976).
64. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 68 Inl. App. 3d 829, 386
N.E.2d 599 (1979).
65. Massachusetts Elec. Co. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, - Mass. -,
375 N.E.2d 1192 (1978).
66. Quaker Oats Co. v. Cedar Rapids Human Rights Comm'n, 268 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1978).
67. Castellano v. Linden Bd. of Educ., 158 N.J. Super. 350, 386 A.2d 396 (1978).
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sylvania,68 and Wisconsin 69 followed New York's lead.7" These courts
generally based their decisions on state antidiscrimination or fair em-
ployment laws 7' and held that Gilbert's interpretation of Title VII did
not dictate the result under state law.72 As the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court recognized, state law may "impose a higher duty than
that existing under present Federal law."73 An interpretation of state
law that requires the inclusion of pregnancy benefits in a comprehen-
sive disability plan, reasoned that court, "is certainly not inconsistent
with the expressed purpose of Title VII of eliminating all practices
which lead to inequality in employment opportunity. 74
One year after its decision in Gilbert, the United States Supreme
Court handed down its final word on pregnancy discrimination before
Congress acted. In Nashville Gas Company v. Sally,75 the Court again
faced the question of when an employment policy that "attaches a spe-
cial burden to the risk of absenteeism caused by pregnancy" violates
Title VII.76 This time, however, Justice Stevens observed, the Court
made clear that the correct answer to this question is neither "always"
nor "never," but simply "sometimes. 77
Satty involved two distinct employment practices-sick pay and sen-
iority-and the Supreme Court reached opposite conclusions with re-
68. Anderson v. Upper Bucks County Area Voc. Tech. School, 30 Pa. Commw. Ct. 103, 373
A.2d 126 (1977).
69. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 87
Wis. 2d 56, 273 N.W.2d 786 (1978).
70. Contra, Narrangansett Elec. Co. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 118 R.I.
457, 374 A.2d 1022 (1977); Group Hospitalization, Inc. v. District of Columbia Comm'n on
Human Rights, 380 A.2d 170 (D.C. 1977).
71. "Although only a few states ... have passed legislation specifically prohibiting employ-
ment discrimination based on pregnancy, some 30 states presently interpret their own fair employ-
ment practices laws, state constitutions, or other laws to prohibit sex discrimination based on
pregnancy and childbirth." Pregnancy Benefts and Discrimination Rules, [1978] LAB. L. REP.
(CCH), No. 55, 201. For a comprehensive survey of the various state laws, regulations, guide-
lines, FEP Commission decisions, case law, and Attorney Generals' opinions regarding pregnancy
discrimination, see id. at T 202-36. See also Note, Pregnancy-BasedDiscrimination--Gilbert and
Alternative State Remedies, 81 DICK. L. REv. 517, 536-38 (1977).
72. See, e.g., Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. New York State Human Rights App. Bd., 41
N.Y.2d 84, 85, 885, 359 N.E.2d 393, 394, 390 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1976); Anderson v. Upper Bucks
County Area Voc. Tech. School, 30 Pa. Commw. Ct. 103, 108, 373 A.2d 126, 131 (1977).
73. Massachusetts Elec. Co. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, - Mass..--
375 N.E.2d 1192, 1198 (1978).
74. Id.
75. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
76. Id. at 153 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
77. Id. at 153-54 (Stevens, J., concurring in thejudgment).
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gard to each. The first company policy at issue was the denial of sick
pay to employees disabled by pregnancy, while granting sick pay to
employees disabled by nonoccupational sickness or injury.78 The
Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist79 who had written the Gil-
bert opinion,8 ° found the denial of sick pay to pregnant employees "le-
gally indistinguishable from the disability insurance program upheld in
Gilbert.""s Thus the Court sanctioned the denial with only brief dis-
cussion, citing Gilbert as authority that "exclusions of this kind are not
per se violations of Title VII."82 Nevertheless, the Court remanded the
case for a determination of Mrs. Satty's right to proceed further in the
district court on the theory that denial of sick pay was a "mere pretext"
designed to effect invidious discrimination against women.83 The
Court recognized here, as it had in both Geduldig4 and Gilbert,5 that a
showing of such pretext would overcome the "facial neutrality" of the
sick pay policy.86
The second employment policy at issue in Salty was the denial of
accumulated seniority to employees returning from pregnancy leave. 7
Nashville Gas Company required pregnant employees to take indeter-
minate leave; these employees accumulated no seniority during that
leave and forfeited all seniority previously accrued.88  Because of this
policy, Mrs. Satty-who had accumulated three years seniority-was
unsuccessful in her three bids for permanent positions with the com-
78. Id. at 138.
79. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, and Blackmun joined in the opinion.
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Powell joined only in that part of the opinion dealing with the
seniority policy. See notes 86-104 infra and accompanying text. Justice Powell filed an opinion,
in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined, concurring in the result and concurring in part.
Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. See note 105 infra.
80. See note 38 supra.
81. 434 U.S. at 143.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 146.
84. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
85. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
86. 434 U.S. at 145.
87. Id. at 138.
88. Id. at 138-39. Nashville Gas Company awarded permanent jobs on the basis of seniority
among equally qualified applicants. The company placed an employee returning from pregnancy
leave in any position for which she was qualified, provided that no individual currently employed
had bid for the job. If a permanent position was not immediately available to the returning em-
ployee, the company attempted to place her in a temporary position. If the employee eventually
acquired a permanent position, she regained her lost seniority for the purposes of pension and
vacation plans, but not of bidding for future job openings. Id. at 139.
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pany after her pregnancy leave.8 9
The Supreme Court unanimously concluded that the seniority policy
violated Title VII's ban on sex discrimination.9" The majority of the
Court used novel reasoning to distinguish the denial of seniority from
the denial of disability benefits or sick pay.9' The Court based its deci-
sion on section 703(a)(2) of Title VII; this section prohibits an employer
from limiting or classifying employees in any way that deprives an in-
dividual of "employment opportunities" or adversely affects an em-
ployee's status because of gender.92 The majority found it beyond
dispute that the company's seniority policy deprived an employee re-
turning from pregnancy leave of employment opportunities and ad-
versely affected her employee status.93 The pivotal question, then, was
whether this was done because of her sex.9 4
Geduldig and Gilbert declared that "because of pregnancy" does not
imply "because of sex" and that pregnancy discrimination is not per se
sex discrimination.95 These decisions also recognized, however, that in
some circumstances one can establish a prima facie violation of Title
VII by showing that a facially neutral employment policy has a dis-
criminatory effect. 96 The Court in Gilbert seemed to doubt whether
89. Id. at 139. Upon Mrs. Satty's return from seven weeks' pregnancy leave, the company
placed her in a temporary position at a lower salary than she had previously earned. After com-
pletion of her temporary assignment-and the three unsuccessful bids for a permanent position-
Mrs. Satty requested that the company terminate her employment in order to draw unemployment
compensation. Had she retained her accumulated seniority, Mrs. Satty concededly would have
secured one of the positions. Id.
90. Id. at 139-40. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Powell joined in this part of the Court's
opinion. See note 78 supra. In a separate opinion, Justice Stevens concurred only in the judg-
ment, reaching the same result through very different reasoning. See note 106 infra.
91. The observations of one commentator privileged to attend oral argument of this case
raises the possibility that the Court's reasoning here was ad hoc.
There was no quarrel with the fact that specific job opportunities were lost to Mrs.
Satty as a result of the seniority policy. At oral argument of this case .... the Justices
were clearly troubled by this fact, especially when the Company's counsel could offer no
reason whatsoever for the existence of the policy. Neither the Company's counsel nor
Mrs. Satty's counsel could offer the Court a plausible means to distinguish Gilben, but
one sensed that some means would be found ....
Barkett, supra note 3, at 469 n.270.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1976). See note 186 in/na for the full text of this section.
93. 434 U.S. at 141.
94. See note 92 supra.
95. See notes 34 and 43 supra and accompanying text. The Court in Saqty reaffirmed this:
"Petitioner's decision not to treat pregnancy as a diseas6 or disability for purposes of seniority
retention is not on its face a discriminatory policy." 434 U.S. at 140.
96. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
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proof of a discriminatory effect will suffice under section 703(a)(1), 97
and the Court in Satty again declined to decide this issue.98 The Satty
Court left no doubt, though, that intentional discrimination and poli-
cies neutral on their face, but having a discriminatory effect, may vio-
late section 703(a)(2). 99
The Court, despite its uncertainty about the significance of a discrim-
inatory effect in General Electric's disability plan, held in Gilbert that
no such effect had been shown.'" To distinguish the seniority policy in
Salty, the Court relied upon a double dichotomy: between benefit and
burden, and between section 703(a)(1) and section 703(a)(2). The em-
ployer in Gilbert, the Court explained, "merely refused to extend to
women a benefit that men cannot and do not receive"; the employer in
Salty, however, imposed a substantial burden on women that men
need not suffer."° The Court characterized the distinction as more
than one of semantics.'" Gilbert held that, under section 703(a)(1),
greater economic benefits need not be paid to one sex or the other
solely because of their "differing roles in the 'scheme of human exist-
ence.' ",103 That holding, the Salty Court reasoned, "does not allow us
to read section 703(a)(2) to permit an employer to burden female em-
ployees in such a way as to deprive them of employment opportunities
because of their different role."'" To complete the analysis, the Court
had only to consider the argument that the seniority policy, though
97. See note 46 supra.
98. We again need not decide whether, when confronted by a facially neutral plan, it is
necessary to prove intent to establish a prima facie violation of§ 703(a)(1). Cf. McDon-
nell Douglas Corp., [411 U.S. 792 (1973)] at 802-806 ....
Respondent failed to prove even a discriminatory effect with respect to petitioner's
sick-leave plan.
434 U.S. at 144-45. The Court, however, did allow a remand with regard to this issue. See note 83
supra and accompanying text.
99. 434 U.S. at 141, citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
100. See notes 47-51 supra and accompanying text. The Court in Satty quoted this portion of
the Gilbert opinion. See 434 U.S. at 141-42.
101. 434 U.S. at 142.
102. Id.
103. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 139 n.17 (1976) (emphasis added).
104. 434 U.S. at 142 (emphasis added). The Court also reasoned that the denial of sick pay to
pregnant employees did not constitute this type of impermissible burden on women employees:
[lit is difficult to perceive how exclusion of pregnancy from a disability insurance plan or
sick-leave compensation program 'would deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities' or 'otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee' in violation of
§ 703(a)(2). The direct effect of the exclusion is merely a loss of income for the period
the employee is not at work; such an exclusion has no direct effect upon either employ-
ment opportunities or job status .... § 703(a)(1) ... would appear to be the proper
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burdensome on female employees, was justified by "business neces-
sity.' 10 5 The Court found no such justification, and therefore held the
policy unlawful under Title VII.l 6
The Satty decision required the lower courts to reassess the implica-
tions drawn from Gilbert. Courts often found a result deemed com-
pelled by Gilbert to be in fact prohibited after Satty. t0 7 The Supreme
section of Title VII under which to analyze questions of sick-leave or disability pay-
ments.
Id. at 144-45.
In its report on the 1978 amendment to Title VII, the House committee in charge of the bill
criticized the Court's conclusions here, stating that the Court "did not explain why the 'burden'
approach did not apply in Gilbert, where only women were burdened with paying their living
expenses out of their own savings during a disability period. Nor did it explain why the right to
retain one's seniority while absent from work is not a 'benefit.'" H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 4,
at 3. The committee concluded, therefore, that Satty "left both employers and employees in the
untenable position of guessing, without any judicial guidance, whether the courts would apply the
'benefits' or the 'burdens' label to a particular policy." Id.
105. 434 U.S. at 143. The "business necessity" defense to a Title VII claim is a judicially-
evolved doctrine to the effect that Title VII does not prohibit employment practices required by
business necessity, so long as no discriminatory intent exists. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 431 (1971). In Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1006 (1971), the court explained that the "test" under this doctrine is "whether there exists an
overriding legitimate business purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient
operation of the business." The court then continued:
Thus, the business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to override any [discrimina-
tory] impact; the challenged practice must effectively carry out the business purpose it is
alleged to serve; and there must be available no acceptable alternative policies or prac-
tices which would better accomplish it equally well with a lesser [discriminatory] impact.
Id. at 798. See generally Note, Business Necessity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 A
No-AlternativeApproach, 84 YALE L. J. 98 (1974). The business necessity defense supplements the
statutory exemption from Title VII's requirements for bona fide occupational qualifications. See
note 190 infra.
106. In a separate opinion, Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment of the Court in Saty,
but characterized the dichotomies on which the Court relied as "illusory" and capable of en-
gendering "confusion among those who must make compliance decisions on a day-to-day basis."
434 U.S. at 153-54 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Consequently, Justice Stevens of-
fered an alternative, "and rather pragmatic, basis for reconciling the two parts of the decision with
each other and with [Gilbert]." Id. at 153. This reconciliation allows an employment policy which
burdens pregnant or formerly pregnant employees, but "only to the extent that the focus of the
policy is. .. on the physical condition [of pregnancy] rather than the person." Id. at 156 n.7.
Though the Gilbert Court held that pregnancy discrimination is not per se sex discrimination, still,
in Justice Stevens' view, "discrimination against pregnant or formerly pregnant employees-as
compared with other employees-does constitute sex discrimination." Id. at 155. The difference,
expressed "pragmatically," is whether or not the employer has "a policy which adversely affects a
woman beyond the term of her pregnancy leave." Id. If the employer's policy treats pregnancy as
more than a "temporal gap in the full employment status of a woman," then, according to Justice
Stevens, that policy violates Title VII as interpreted by Gilbert. Id. at 156-57.
107. Compare Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, Pickens County School Dist. A, 15 Empl. Prac.
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Court, however, gave little guidance in Satty for applying its extempo-
raneous "benefit/burden" distinction to pregnancy related employment
policies.' Thus, the task of bringing order to this area of Title VII fell
virtually by default to the Congress.
II. THE PROBLEM
On October 31, 1978, President Carter signed into law the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978,109 amending section 701 of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.10 Ostensibly, the amendment's purpose was
merely to "clarify" existing law, not to substantively change the appli-
cation of Title VII.' This estimation is too modest, however, in view
of the many new questions that the amendment raises.
The 1978 amendment, at times referred to as the "Gilbert Amend-
Dec. 6111 (D.S.C. 1977) (refusal to rehire teacher because of pregnancy not sexually discrimina-
tory in light of Gilbert) with Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, Pickens County School Dist. A, 599
F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 453 (1979) (intervening Saty decision requires
reversal of district court).
108. See H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 4, at 3 for a discussion of the problematic "bene-
fit/burden" distinction.
109. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076. Senator Williams introduced S. 995 on March 15,
1977, for himself and ten co-sponsors. Representative Hawkins introduced H.R. 5055, with
eighty-one co-sponsors, on the same date. On April 5, 1977, the House bill was reintroduced as
H.R. 6075. The Senate Subcommittee on Labor reported S. 995 to the full Committee on Human
Resources on June 8, 1977. This committee, after amending the bill to add an effective date and to
provide for the adjustment of existing benefit plans, unanimously reported the bill to the Senate
on June 16, 1977. The Senate passed S. 995 on September 16, 1977.
On February 2, 1978, the House Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities reported H.R.
6075 to the full Committee on Education and Labor. This committee, on March 2, 1978, amended
the bill to provide for exemption of abortions from fringe benefit coverage except where the life of
the mother is endangered, and then, by a vote of 25 to 6, reported the bill to the House. The
House passed H.R. 6075 on July 18, 1978. Because the Senate version of the bill contained no
abortion amendment, the House Committee of Conference met to consider S. 995 and issued its
report on October 13, 1978. On this same date, the Senate agreed to recede from its disagreement
with the House abortion amendment, with some modification, and passed S. 995 as amended. On
October 15, 1978, the House approved the bill and sent it to the President. See S. REP. No. 331,
supra note 56, at 3; H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 4, at 4; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1786, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3 (1978), reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4765.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
11I. "This bill is intended to make plain that, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions is discrimination
based on sex." S. REP. No. 33 1, supra note 56, at 3. See also H.R. RP. No., 948, supra note 4, at
2. in which the committee stated that the House bill "will amend Title VII to clarify Congress'
intent to include discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions in
the prohibition against sex discrimination in employment." See also id. at 3-4 (necessary that
Congress "clarify its original intent" with regard to sex discrimination).
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ment," 112 embodies Congress' express intention to overrule the Gilbert
decision by making clear that sex discrimination includes pregnancy
based discrimination.1 3 Congress, through this amendment, sought to
"reflect the commonsense view" of sex discrimination and to "ensure
that working women are protected against all forms of employment
discrimination based on sex.""' 4 The Senate and House committees
that studied the amendment concluded that the 1972 EEOC pregnancy
guidelines, 5 the pre- Gilbert lower federal court rulings, "t6 and the dis-
senting Justices in Gilbert'"7 had correctly interpreted the prohibition
of sex discrimination in Title VII of the 1964 Act. Furthermore, the
House committee charged that, contrary to the original congressional
intent, the Supreme Court's "narrow interpretations of Title VII tend to
erode our national policy of nondiscrimination in employment," leav-
ing in their wake "a state of national confusion" and "inconsistent
practices from State to State."' 8 This committee further found that the
high court's interpretations of Title VII portended "an intolerable
112. See, e.g., I A. LARSON, supra note 62, at 8-19.
113. For a discussion of Gilbert, see notes 32-57 supra and accompanying text.
114. H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 4, at 3 (emphasis added). Compare the virtually identical
language in S. REP. No. 331, supra note 56, at 3.
115. Referring to the EEOC's 1972 guidelines which interpreted Title VI's prohibition of sex
discrimination to include discrimination based on pregnancy or related medical conditions (see
note 19 supra), both the Senate and House committees concluded that "these guidelines rightly
implemented the Congress' intent in barring sex discrimination in the 1964 [Civil Rights] act." S.
REP. No. 331, supra note 56, at 2. See also H.R. No. 948, supra note 4, at 2.
116. The House committee report noted that, prior to Gilbert, "[e]ighteen Federal district
courts and all seven Federal courts of appeals which have considered the issue have rendered
decisions prohibiting discrimination in employment based on pregnancy, in accord with the Fed-
eral guidelines." H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 4, at 2. See also cases cited in notes 24 and 25
su.pra. The Senate committee report referred only to the pre- Gilbert decisions in the federal courts
of appeals. S. REP. No. 331, supra note 56, at 2.
117. The Senate committee report quoted with approval Justice Brennan's statement in his
dissent in Gilbert, that "[s]urely it offends common sense to suggest ... that a classification re-
volving around pregnancy is not, at the minimum, strongly 'sex related'." S. REP. No. 331, supra
note 56, at 2, quoting General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 149 (Brennan, J., dissenting), See
also H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 4, at 2. Both the Senate and House committees also quoted
Justice Stevens' argument in his dissent in Gilbert, that "it is the capacity to become pregnant
which primarily differentiates the female from the male." S. REP. No. 331, supra note 56, at 3;
H.R. REP. No. 48, supra note 4, at 2, quoting 429 U.S. at 162 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Both
committees viewed the quoted passages from the Gilbert dissents as "correctly express[ing] both
the principle and the meaning of Title VII." S. REP. No. 331, supra note 56, at 2; H.R. REP. No.
948, supra note 4, at 2.
118. H.R. RaP. No. 948, supra note 4, at 3. Note that even after the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act of 1978, the danger of "inconsistent practices from State to State" still exists, though to a lesser
degree. See notes 72 and 73 supra and accompanying text.
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potential trend in employment practices" to which Congress could
not yield. 19  The Senate committee likewise viewed Gilbert as
"threaten[ing] to undermine the central purpose of the sex discrimina-
tion prohibitions of [T]itle VII."'12 Congress added section 701(k) to
alleviate this threat.
As one commentator has observed,' 2 ' section 701(k) has on its face
two functions: definitional and substantive. Section 701 is the defini-
tional section of Title VII;' 22 the first clause of subsection (k) therefore
appropriately defines "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex," for all
purposes of Title VII, as including "because of or on the basis of preg-
nancy, childbirth or related medical conditions."' 123 The second clause
of the subsection then imposes a requirement that "women affected by
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the
same for all employment-related purposes. . . as other persons not so
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work. . ". ." If this
clause in fact announces a new substantive obligation for employers, its
presence in an otherwise definitional section of Title VII is anomalous.
Of course, Congress could have simply amended the definition of "sex
discrimination" and relied on existing substantive provisions of Title
VII-particularly sections 703(a)(1) and (2)125 -to implement the
newly clarified original intent of the prohibition of sex discrimination.
Indeed, if the sole purpose of section 701(k) is merely to make explicit
what has always been embodied in Title VII, (though disregarded by
the Supreme Court), one may question the necessity of the second
clause of the amendment.
26
119. H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 4, at 4.
120. S. REP. No. 331, supra note 56, at 3.
121. Barkett, supra note 3. at 482 n.306.
122. The other terms defined, for purposes of Title VII, by subsections of§ 701 are as follows:
(a) "person;" (b) "employer," (c) "employment agency;" (d) "labor organization;" (f) "employee;"
(g) "commerce;" (h) "industry affecting commerce;" (i) "State;" and (j) "religion." Subsection (e)
alone goes beyond pure definition by declaring that "[a] labor organization shall be deemed to be
engaged in an industry affecting commerce" if certain enumerated criteria are satisfied, but this
subsection in effect simply expands the definition in subsection (d).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(k).
124. Id. (emphasis added).
125. See note 186 infra.
126. Conceivably, Congress may have been concerned solely with limiting the effect of
§ 703(h), the "Bennett Amendment." See note 56 supra. Then the language requiring equal treat-
ment for pregnant workers may be viewed as merely prefatory to the disclaimer of the applicabil-
ity of § 703(h). The legislative history of § 701(k), however, contradicts this interpretation of its
underlying intent. See notes 113-120 supra and accompanying text. Furthermore, both the House
Number 3]
Washington University Open Scholarship
626 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 58:607
The legislative history of section 701(k) belies the interpretation that
Congress intended the amendment to impose a new substantive obliga-
tion on employers. As indicated earlier,'27 congressional committees
that studied the amendment viewed it as simply clarifying the intent of
the Congress that enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The amend-
ment did this by expressly broadening the definition of sex discrim-
ination, "as proscribed in the existing statute, to include these
physiological occurrences peculiar to women [viz., pregnancy, child-
birth, and related medical conditions] .. ."28 The House committee
recognized that the amendment would "reflect no new legislative man-
date. . . nor effect changes in practices, costs, or benefits beyond those
intended by Title VII. . ."' On the contrary, the amendment pur-
posefully utilized a narrow approach to dispel the confusion resulting
from Gilbert.130
Given the barren legislative history of the addition of sex discrimina-
tion to the prohibitions of Title VII in 1964,131 the declaration of an-
other Congress, fourteen years later, that it is merely clarifying the
original intent underlying that addition, is less than candid. This is
particularly true if, as the little available history indicates, the sponsor
and Senate committee reports recognized that the disclaimer pr6vision of§ 701(k) is "ji]n addition
to" the provision mandating that pregnant employees be treated the same as nonpregnant, but
similarly disabled, employees. H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 4, at 7; S. REP. No. 331, supra note
56, at 7.
Most likely, Congress intended the second clause of § 701(k) to clarify the implications of its
broadened definition of 'sex discrimination'; that is, Congress, by expressly requiring equal treat-
ment for pregnant workers, was merely spelling out what the already existing substantive provi-
sions of Title VII would require of employers under the expanded definition. This interpretation
seems the most reasonable in light of the legislative history of § 701(k). See notes 128-130 infra
and accompanying text. Congress' attempt at translucence in § 701(k), however, has resulted in
opaqueness with regard to fundamental questions of the interpretation and application of the
amendment. See notes 171-200 infra and accompanying text.
127. See note 111 supra and accompanying text.
128. S. REP. No. 331, supra note 56, at 3-4. See also H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 4, at 3-4.
129. H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 4, at 3.
130. Id. at 4.
131. As Justice Rehnquist pointed out in his opinion for the Court in General Elec. Co, v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976): "The legislative history of Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimina-
tion is notable primarily for its brevity." Id. at 143. Indeed, Representative Green cited the ab-
sence of legislative hearings in her arguments against the House floor amendment adding the ban
on sex discrimination. She noted that "there was not one word of testimony in regard to this
amendment given before the Committee on the Judiciary of the House or before the Committee
on Education and Labor of the House, where this bill was considered." 110 CoNG. REc. 2582
(1964). See generally Miller, Sex Discrimination and Title VII ofthe Civil Rights,4ct of 1964, 51
MINN. L. REv. 877, 879-85 (1967).
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of the sex discrimination amendment in 1964 intended it to help pre-
vent passage of Title VII by that Congress.1 32 One may argue that it is
irrelevant whether section 701(k) is only expositive of the original con-
gressional intent in enacting Title VII or, instead, imposes a new sub-
stantive requirement upon employers; the prospective effects of the
amendment will be significant regardless of the interpretation. 33 Seri-
ous problems arise, however, with regard to the application of section
132. Rep. Green of Oregon held this view, as evidenced by her warning to the House that the
"sex discrimination" amendment to Title VII "will clutter up the bill and it may later-very
well-be used to help destroy this section of the bill by some of the very people who today support
it." 110 CONG. REc. 2581 (1964).
The origin of the amendment justifies Rep. Green's skepticism. Rep. Smith of Virginia, a
staunch opponent of the Civil Rights Act, introduced the amendment on the House floor, and a
group of Southern representatives joined in support: Rivers (S.C.), Andrews (Ala.), Huddleston
(Ala.), Tuten (Ga.), and Pool (Tex.). See id. at 2577, 2583-84. The proponents argued that, unless
a prohibition of sex discrimination were included in Title VII, employers would always hire black
women over white women. See id. at 2578. Though she did not address this nonsequitur, Rep.
Green did question the sincerity of the proponents' concern for women's rights when she sardoni-
cally welcomed the "conversion" of those gentlemen "who are most strong in their support" for
the amendment, noting that these same congressmen "probably gave us the most opposition when
we considered the bill which would grant equal pay for equal work just a very few months ago."
Id. at 2581.
To be sure, several congresswomen also spoke in support of the sex discrimination amendment,
including Bolton (Ohio), Griffiths (Mich.), St. George (N.Y.), May (Wash.), and Kelly (N.Y.).
See id. at 2578-82. Rep. Kelly sought to reassure women's rights advocates by voicing her cer-
tainty that "the acceptance of the amendment will not repeal the protective laws of the several
States." Id. at 2583. Nevertheless, as Rep. Green stated, "[tihere was not one single organization
in the entire United States that petitioned either one of [the House] committees to add this amend-
ment to the bill." Id. at 2582. In fact, many women's groups, including the President's Commis-
sion on the Status of Women, opposed the amendment on the ground that sex discrimination
involves problems sufficiently different from other discrimination to make their joint treatment
under Title VII undesirable. See Miller, supra note 131, at 881; 110 CONG. REc. 2577-78 (1964)
(remarks of Rep. Celler).
The House finally passed the sex discrimination amendment by a vote of 168-133. 110 CONG.
REC. at 2584. Rep. Green's apprehensions with regard to the underlying intent of the amend-
ment's sponsors were apparently well founded. Ten of the eleven congressmen who spoke in sup-
port of the amendment voted against the Civil Rights Bill as amended. See Miller, supra note
131, at 882 n.29.
133. In testimony before the congressional committees considering the legislation, estimates of
the added employer costs for maternity benefits that would be required by the Pregnancy Discrim-
ination Act under temporary disability plans ranged from $130 million to $571 million. See Legis-
lation to Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the Basis ofPregnancy:, Hearings on H.i 5055 and H.
6075 Be/ore the Subcommt on Employment Opportunities ofthe House Comm on Education and
Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 180-86 (1977); Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy, 1977 Hear-
ings on S. 995 Be/ore the Subcomn. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 424-25 (1977). Both the House and Senate committees, however, found the De-
partment of Labor's estimate of $191.5 million in additional costs, including administrative costs,
to be the most reasonable. This amount represents a 3.5 percent increase in total contributions to
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701(k) precisely because its underlying intent is unclear. To these
problems this Note now turns.
The Senate committee report clearly states that the basic standard
embodied in section 701(k) is "comparability among employees."' 134
As one senator explained in debate, the "touchstone of compliance"
with the amendment is equality of treatment. 35 Both the literal lan-
guage of the amendment 136 and abundant, unambiguous legislative
history 137 compel this interpretation of the subsection. Thus, differen-
tial treatment of employees for any employment related purpose must
be based on differences in the employees' ability or inability to work
temporary disability plans-an additional l- cents per dollar of wages for covered workers.
H.R. REP. No. 948, supranote 4, at 9-10; S. REP. No. 331, supra note 56, at 10-1l.
To the $191.5 million estimate must be added the additional employer costs incurred under
hospital-medical benefit plans as a result of the amendment to Title VII. Estimates of this cost
reached $1.7 billion, representing a 5.4 percent increase in the cost of hospital-medical benefits.
The Senate committee report, however, challenged the reliability of this figure in that two-thirds
of the estimate was apparently based on the "assumption that this legislation could require medi-
cal and hospital insurance coverage for maternity under all plans administered by insurance com-
panies"-an assumption expressly repudiated by the committee reports. Id. at 9. See also notes
164-70 infra and accompanying text. While both the Senate and House committees conceded that
"no accurate estimate of this cost is practicable," the Senate committee contended that the cost
increase would be "far less" than the 5.4 percent estimate. S. REP. No. 331, supra note 56, at 10;
H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 4, at 10. The Senate committee concluded that the expected costs
due to the amendment, "although not negligible, can be sustained without any undue burden on
employers." S. REP. No. 331, su.pra note 56, at 9. The committee added, however, that "even a
very high cost could not justify continuation" of pregnancy discrimination. Id. at I1.
The Congressional Budget Office assessed the likelihood of increased governmental costs due to
H.R. 6075 and concluded that "no additional cost to the government would be incurred as a result
of enactment of this bill." See H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 4, at 12.
134. S. REP. No. 331, supra note 56, at 5.
135. 123 CONG. REc. 29645 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Stafford).
136. "[W]omen affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shallbe trealed
the same for all employment-related purposes. . . as other persons not so affected but similar in
their ability or inability to work. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(k) (1976 & Supp. II 1978) (emphasis
added).
137. [Under this bill,] [piregnant women who are able to work must be permitted to work
on the same conditions as other employees; and when they are not able to work for
medical reasons, they must be accorded the same rights, leave privileges and other bene-
fits, as other workers who are disabled from working.
...The bill would simply require that pregnant women be treated the same as other
employees on the basis of their ability or inability to work.
• ..[T]his bill would prevent employers from treating pregnancy and childbirth difer.
ent6i from other causes of disability....
[ . Section 701(k)] makes clear that fringe benefit programs must treat women af-
fected by [pregnancy-related] conditions equally to other employees on the basis of their
ability or inability to work; ....
S. REP. No. 331, supra note 56, at 4, 14 (emphasis added).
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rather than on differences in sex, including differences resulting from
pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions. 138
The Senate committee report makes clear that ability to work is the
only permissible criterion for differential treatment of employees, and
that employers may not approach pregnancy generically, "without re-
gard to its functional comparability to other conditions." 39 The treat-
ment of pregnant employees must focus "not on their condition alone
but on the actual effects of that condition on their ability to work."'' 40
The above interpretation of section 701(k) seems to establish a
straightforward, concise rule for employers: treat pregnancy related
disabilities the same as any other disability for all employment related
purposes. Moreover, the EEOC guidelines on pregnancy related em-
ployment policies, modified only slightly after enactment of section
70 1(k), t4 1 and a series of thirty-seven "Question and Answers on Preg-
H.R. 6075 . . . specifically defines standards which require that pregnant workers be
treated the same as other employees on the basis of their ability or inability to work.
. ..The bill would simply require that pregnant women be treated the same as other
employees on the basis of their ability or inability to work.
This bill would prevent employers from treating pregnancy, childbirth and related
medical conditions in a manner dfferent from their treatment of other disabilities. In
other words, this bill would require that women disabled due to pregnancy, childbirth or
other related medical conditions be provided the same benefits as those provided other
disabled workers.
H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 4, at 3, 4, 5 (emphasis added).
Remarks of legislators during debate on the amendment echo this understanding that the
amendment embodies a basic principle of equality of treatment: "[T]his bill demands equal treat-
ment and nothing more. When an employer treats pregnancy, childbirth, and related conditions
the same as he treats any other disabling condition, then he has complied with this bill." 123
CONG. REC. 29645 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Stafford) (emphasis added). "If there is any ambiguity,
with regard to income maintenance plans, I cannot see it. ' .... shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes."'" Id. at 29644 (remarks of Sen. Williams) (emphasis added).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(k) (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
139. S. REP. No. 331, supra note 56, at 4. See also note 133 supra.
140. S. REP. No. 331, supra note 56, at 4.
141. The EEOC modified in only minor respects its guidelines on employment policies relat-
ing to pregnancy and childbirth in response to the "Gilbert Amendment." Indeed, the EEOC
prefaced its amended guidelines with the statement that "[tihe Pregnancy Discrimination Act reaf-
firms EEOC's Guidelines with but minor modifications. For that reason, the Commission be-
lieved that only slight modifications of its Guidelines were necessary ... " 44 Fed. Reg. 23804
(1979).
Sections (a) and (b) of the amended guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1979), now read, in part, as
follows (added material is italicized, deleted material is bracketed):
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nancy Discrimination" appended to those guidelines, 4 2 embody this
basic principle 43 of the 1978 amendment. The guidelines require
equal treatment among pregnant employees and those suffering from
other disabilities with regard to coverage of pre-existing conditions; t' n
alternative light duty jobs; 4  disability determinations;146 predeter-
mined leave time; 147 retention ofjob; 148 credit for time on leave; 49 time
limits on benefits; 50 benefits during leave time; 15  use of vacation
time;' 52 leave for childcare; 15 3 benefits for dependents; 5 4 optional in-
surance plans; 55 reimbursable expenses; 5 6 dollar limits on benefits;'
(a) A written -or unwritten employment policy or practice which excludes from em-
ployment applicants or employees because of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical
conditions is in prima facie violation of Title VII.
(b) Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, [miscarriage, abortion,]
childbirth or related medical conditions, [and recovery therefrom are,] for all job-related
purposes, [temporary disabilities and should be treated as such] shallbe treated the same
as disabilities caused or contributed to by other medical conditions, under any health or
[temporary] disability insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with employ-
ment. Written or unwritten employment policies and practices involving matters such as
the commencement and duration of leave, the availability of extensions, the accrual of
seniority and other benefits and privileges, reinstatement, and payment under any health
or [temporary] disability insurance or sick leave plan, formal or informal, shall be ap-
plied to disability due to pregnancy, [or] childbirth, or related medical conditions on the
same terms and conditions as they are applied to other [temporary] disabilities.
142. The EEOC approved the "Questions and Answers on Pregnancy Discrimination" on
March 6, 1979, effective March 9, 1979 (44 Fed. Reg. 13278 (1979)), as an appendix to 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604. The EEOC amended the "Questions and Answers" by 44 Fed. Reg. 23804 (1979), effec-
tive April 20, 1979. The purpose of the appendix was "to clarify [the EEOC's] position on issues
relating to enforcement of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act." 29 C.F.R. § 1604 app., at 917
(1979).
143. The introduction to the "Questions and Answers" appendix states that "[t]he basic princi-
ple of the Act is that women affected by pregnancy and related conditions must be treated the
same as other applicants and employees on the basis of their ability or inability to work," 29
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deductibles on benefits; 5 " health insurance coverage;' 59 and extended
benefits.160 Only rarely does the EEOC's interpretation stray from this
requirement of strict equality of treatment.' 6'
The mandate of section 701 (k) is clear for an employer who provides
leave or benefits to any disabled employees: provide the same benefits
for similarly disabled pregnant employees. Because most workers are
covered by some form of short term disability plan, 162 section 701(k)
should cause few interpretive problems in the usual case. 63  The
problems lie, rather, in the unusual case of an employer who provides
little or no leave or benefits to any disabled employee. Under Title VII,
may that employer deny maternity benefits to a pregnant employee?
Furthermore, may the employer discharge a pregnant employee who of
necessity takes maternity leave, though she is thereby treated the same
as any similarly disabled, but nonpregnant, employee?
158. Question 27.
159. Question 28.
160. Questions 29-30. Questions 1 and 2 deal with the applicability of the Pregnancy Discrim-
ination Act; question 13, unwed pregnancies; question 14, the absence of male employees; ques-
tion 19, preemption of state laws; question 20, coverage of state employees; question 31, sharing of
costs, question 32, reduction in benefits; question 33, self-insurance; question 34, abortion discrim-
mation; and questions 35-37, benefit coverage of abortions.
161. Question 12 of the appendix asks: "Must an employer hire a woman who is medically
unable, because of a pregnancy-related condition, to perform a necessary function of a job?" The
EEOC's answer states, in part, that "[an employer cannot refuse to hire a woman because of her
pregnancy-related condition so long as she is able to perform the major functions necessary to the
job." C.F.R. § 1604 app., at 919 (1979). At least one commentator has questioned the authority of
the EEOC to qualify "functions necessary to the job" by the word "major," arguing as follows:
Suppose an employer would normally refuse to hire any worker, male or female, who
could not perform all the necessary functions of the job-major, minor, or in-between.
Plainly, under the wording of the statute and under the EEOC's emphatically repeated
refrain, the employer could also refuse to hire a pregnant woman similarly limited in her
ability.
I A. LARSON, supra note 62, at 8-26 (emphasis in original). This same argument leads one to
question the EEOC's authority to require an employer to provide maternity leave though it pro-
vides no sick leave generally. See notes 171-175 infra and accompanying text.
162. In testimony before a House subcommittee concerning the expected cost of implementing
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the Department of Labor estimated that 34.2 million workers
in the private sector alone were covered by temporary disability insurance plans in 1976. Hearings
on HR. 5055 and HR 6075, supra note 133, at 180-81. In similar testimony before a Senate
subcommittee, the American Council of Life Insurance and the Health Insurance Association of
America estimated that 68 percent of the total work force was covered by short-term disability
plans. Hearings on S. 995, supra note 133, at 429.
163. There will, of course, be a question whether a pregnant employee in a particular case is
"similarly disabled" vis-i-vis another employee, so that Section 701(k)'s basic standard of compa-
rability is satisfied. This question, however, seems more one of fact than of statutory interpreta-
tion.
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The legislative history of section 701(k) overwhelmingly supports an
affirmative answer to the first question. The House and Senate com-
mittee reports are replete with assurances that section 701(k) does not
require an employer who provides no fringe benefits to any employee
to provide maternity benefits.164 The sponsors of the amendment,' 65 as
well as other legislators in debate, 166 President Carter upon signing the
bill into law, 167 and various commentators,168 all acknowledged this co-
rollary to the equal treatment for pregnant employees that section
701(k) demands. The 1978 amendment clearly does not entitle a preg-
nant employee to favored treatment169 where a similarly disabled, but
nonpregnant, employee does not enjoy the security of disability or
health insurance benefits.' 7
0
The second question regarding discharge of a pregnant employee is
more difficult, and section 701(k) gives no clear answer. As one com-
mentator has noted, "some leave accompanying childbirth is an ac-
cepted modem necessity, and a policy of denying it, with discharge as
164. An employer who does not provide disability benefits or paid sick leave to other
employees will not, because of S. 995, have to provide these benefits.
[S]ince the basic standard is comparability among employees, an employer who does not
provide medical benefits at all would not have to pay the medical costs of pregnancy or
childbirth.
S. REP. No. 331, supra note 56, at 4-5. See also id. at 9; H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 4, at 5, 6.
165. Rep. Hawkins, who introduced the House bill, noted that "this legislation would not
require an employer to have a temporary disability plan or provide other employee benefits.
Rather, the bill requires that employers who currently provide benefits for other disabilities must
provide the same benefits for pregnancy." 124 CONG. REC. H6863 (daily ed. July 18, 1978). See
also 123 CONG. REc. 29644 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
166. "[T]he legislation would not require employers to provide hospital medical coverage for
maternity. What it does require is that where hospitalization is offered for other disabilities, it
must be offered on the same basis for pregnancy related disabilities." 123 CoNo. REc. 29642
(1977) (remarks of Sen. Bayh). See also 124 CONG. REC. H6864 (daily ed. July 18, 1978) (remarks
of Rep. Sarasin).
167. President Carter, in a statement made when signing into law S. 995, emphasized that the
amendment "does not bestow favored treatment on America's 42 million working women.... It
simply requires employers who have medical disability plans to provide for disability due to preg-
nancy and related conditions on an equal basis with other medical conditions." Statement on
Signing S. 995 Into Law, 14 WEEKLY COMp. OF PRES. Doc. 1906 (Oct. 31, 1978).
168. See, e.g., Barkett, supra note 3, at 483; [1978] LAB. L. REP. (CCH), No. 55, Pregnancy
Benefts and Discrimination Rules 7, 11.
169. Statement on Signing S. 995 Into Law, supra note 167, at 1906.
170. Subsection (b) of the EEOC guidelines on pregnancy related employment policies sup-
ports this view. That subsection, unlike subsections (a) and (c) of the guidelines, expressly incor-
porates section 701(k)'s "same treatment" standard. See note 141 supra. See also notes 179-180
infra and accompanying text.
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the alternative, is tantamount to a policy of outright discharge for preg-
nancy.""'' On its face, section 701(k) seems to sanction such discharge
so long as the "touchstone of compliance"-equality of treatment
among similarly disabled employees-is satisfied.' 72 The discharge, on
this view, is not for pregnancy, but rather for disablement. One may
even argue that this is an equitable result: if an employee stricken by
appendicitis faces discharge because little or no sick leave is available,
there is no apparent basis on which a pregnant employee should re-
ceive favored treatment.'7 3 Though the underlying cause differs, the
inability to work is the same. Therefore, because under section 701(k)
differential treatment of pregnant and nonpregnant workers may be
grounded only upon differences in their ability to work, 74 an employer
who grants sick leave to a pregnant employee while denying it to an
employee similarly disabled by some other cause would apparently vio-
late Title VII as amended-not by discharging the pregnant employee,
but by failing to discharge her.' 75
If section 701(k) in fact compels this result, its enactment is a mixed
171. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 62, at 8-31.
172. See notes 134-40 supra and accompanying text.
173. Indeed, in at least one respect--that of notice of impending disablement and opportunity
for advanced planning-a pregnant employee is already in a more favorable position than one
suddenly stricken by a disabling malady.
174. See notes 139-40 supra and accompanying text.
175. This same reasoning implies a violation of section 701(k) if, in what is likely the more
frequent case, an employer were to allow longer maternity leave than sick leave generally. One
commentator hypothesizes an employer who limits sick leave to one month generally, but allows
four months' maternity leave. He then continues:
Suppose a male employee contracts hepatitis and is unable to work for four months.
Should he be heard to complain that he is being discriminated against on the ground of
sex, because the kind of physical disability he is capable of does not entitle him to as long
a leave as pregnant female employees get?
1 A. LARSON, supra note 62, at 8-34. Despite the clear statutory command of equal treatment
among similarly disabled employees, Larson concludes that the male employee's argument "does
not hold up on close scrutiny."
[W]e began with an inherent physical inequality affecting employability of one sex exclu-
sively; to offset that inequality and restore equality of employment opportunity, it was
necessary to afford an unequal benefit in the form of maternity leave. Equality of em-
ployment opportunity having been thus restored, nothing further is needed to redress the
male-female balance.
Id. (emphasis in original). In Larson's analysis, if Title VII as amended did not allow this "admit-
tedly 'unequal' solution in the interest of a higher equality"-viz, "substantial equality of employ-
ment opportunity"--then an employer could never choose to limit or not permit sick' leave. Id. at
8-31 to 8-34. If the male employee with hepatitis may demand four months' leave, "the next
round would find females demanding four month leaves for non-maternity illnesses and disabili-
ties." Id. at 8-34 (emphasis in original). The "end result," according to Larson, would then be
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blessing for pregnant workers. Prior to the Gilbert decision, the EEOC
consistently maintained that an employer could not lawfully discharge
an employee solely on the basis of pregnancy, unless justified by busi-
ness necessity.' 76 Some courts, moreover, shared this position.' 77 In
1972, the EEOC codified this interpretation of Title VII in its guide-
lines on pregnancy related employment policies. 78 Subsection (a) of
these guidelines provided that an "employment policy or practice
which excludes from employment . . . employees because of preg-
nancy is in prima facie violation of [T]itle VII."'1 79 Subsection (c) pro-
vided that "[w]here the termination of an employee who is temporarily
disabled is caused by an employment policy under which insufficient or
no leave is available, such a termination violates the act if it has a dis-
parate impact on employees of one sex and is not justified by business
necessity."' 8 0 Significantly, the EEOC reissued subsection (a) with
that "the employer would have been forced, willy-nilly, to adopt a sick leave policy for everyone
with leaves as long as the longest leave that might be granted for any pregnancy." Id.
Applying the "basic standard" of section 701(k)-equality of treatment among similarly dis-
abled employees-avoids this "snowballing" effect. Each employee is then entitled to the same
leave as any other similarly disabled employee, regardless of the cause of the disability, and no
"reverse discrimination" issue arises. Furthermore, it is not clear that abiding by the plain lan-
guage of section 701 (k) will sacrifice the "higher equality" of "substantial equality of employment
opportunity" between the sexes. Larson's argument from "an inherent physical inequality affect-
ing employability of one sex exclusively" applies as well to a male employee requiring a prostatec-
tomy and faced with a "no leave" policy. So long as the particular disablement is sex specific and
no sick leave is available, the "physical inequality" will affect the employability of that one sex
exclusively. Pregnancy, in this respect, is indistinguishable from other sex specific disablements.
Though strong societal considerations may favor preferential treatment of pregnancy, logic does
not dictate such preference as a condition of attaining equality of employment opportunity.
176. [1974] EEOC DEC. (CCH) 6487 (Dec. No. 75-038); [19741 EEOC DEc. (CCH) 1 6476
(Dec. No. 75-026); [1974] EEOC DEC. (CCII) 1 6475 (Dec, No. 75-025); [1974] EEOC DEC.
(CCH) 1 6474 (Dec. No. 75-024); [1974] EEOC DEc. (CCH) 1 6443 (Dec. No. 75-055); [1974]
EEOC DEC. (CCH) T 6442 (Dec. No. 75-072); [19731 EEOC DEc. (CCH) 1 6411 (Dec. No. 71-
2309 (1971)); [1973] EEOC DEC. (CCII) 6268 (Dec. No. 71-1897 (1971)); [1973] EEOC DEC.
(CCH) T 6197 (Dec. No. 71-1100 (1970)); [1973] EEOC DEC. (CCH) 1 6170 (Dec. No. 71-308
(1970)); [1973] EEOC DEC. (CCH) 1 6122 (Dec. No. 70-600 (1970)). Regarding the "business
necessity" defense to a Title VII action, see note 107 supra.
177. See, e.g., Holthaus v. Compton & Sons, Inc., 514 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1975); St. John v.
G.W. Murphy Indus., Inc., 407 F. Supp. 695 (D.N.C. 1976); Bradley v. Cothern, 384 F. Supp. 1216
(D. Tex. 1974). Contra, Godwin v. Patterson, 363 F. Supp. 238 (D. Ala. 1973), Yacated and re-
manded, 498 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1974).
178. See note 141 supra.
179. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(a) (1979).
180. Id. § 1604.10(c).
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only minor modifications' 8 ' after the 1978 amendment to Title VII and
left subsection (c) entirely unchanged. Neither subsection, however, in-
corporates the basic principle of section 701(k)--equal treatment of
pregnant and nonpregnant employees, with disparity permitted only if
based on ability to work.18 2 One may question, therefore, whether the
EEOC correctly interpreted Title VII's ban on sex discrimination in
light of section 701(k).
The potential conflict between section 701(k) and the EEOC guide-
lines stems from the subsection's dual functions discussed earlier.183
Section 701(k) clearly mandates equal treatment for pregnant employ-
ees based upon their "ability or inability to work."' 84 Yet this subsec-
tion also defines "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" as including,
for purposes of Title VII, "because of or on the basis of pregnancy."185
There lies the rub; the obligation that the subsection imposes contra-
dicts an obligation that the definition implies.
The contradiction is evident when one applies the definition in sec-
tion 701(k) to a primary substantive provision of Title VII: Section
703(a)(1). This section declares it unlawful for an employer to "dis-
charge any individual . .. because of such individual's ... sex
.... ,"86 If one substitutes "because of pregnancy" for "because of
sex," in accordance with the definition in section 701(k), then section
703(a)(1) appears to flatly prohibit an employer from discharging an
employee because she is pregnant-regardless of whether an employer
would discharge a similarly disabled, but nonpregnant, employee. 8 7
181. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(a) (1979). For the current version of this subsection, see note 141
stupra.
182. See note 134 supra and accompanying text. Subsection (b), on the other hand, does in-
corporate this principle. See note 141 supra.
183. See notes 121-26 supra and accompanying text.
184. See notes 134-61 supra and accompanying text.
185. See note 123 supra and accompanying text.
186. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1976). Section 703(a) of Title VII states in full as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
187. Presumably, the "business necessity" defense would still be available to the employer.
See note 107 supra.
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According to the ninety-fifth Congress, furthermore, this was the origi-
nal intent of the eighty-eighth Congress in 1964.118 On this view, the
EEOC guidelines discussed above correctly interpret Title VII. Dis-
charge because of pregnancy is unlawful per se despite the mandate of
section 701(k) that pregnant employees be treated the same as all simi-
larly disabled employees.
One commentator has rejected this conclusion, arguing that the
equal treatment clause of section 701(k) restricts the scope of the sub-
stantive provisions of section 703.189 On this view, the second clause of
section 701(k) supplements the bona fide occupational qualification
section. 190 Section 703(a)(1), therefore, will permit an employer to dis-
charge an employee because she is pregnant so long as she is "treated
the same as employees similar in their ability or inability to work."'191
This argument is unpersuasive absent evidence of a congressional in-
tent to provide an additional exemption to the requirements of section
703. To be sure, portions of the legislative history of section 701(k)
seem to signal such intent.' 92 Other portions, however, create ambigu-
ity on this point. For example, though the Supreme Court in Gilbert
gave little weight to the EEOC guidelines on pregnancy related em-
ployment policies, 1 3 both congressional committees in charge of the
1978 amendment expressly endorsed the EEOC's interpretation of Title
188. See note IIl supra and accompanying text.
189. Barkett, supra note 3, at 482 n.306.
190. Id. The bona fide occupational qualification section referred to is section 703(e) of Title
VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-2(e) (1976), which provides in part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, .. it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees ... on the basis of
his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or na-
tional origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise ....
191. Barkett, supra note 3, at 482-83 n.306.
192. The strongest evidence supporting Barkett's argument is, perhaps, the following language
from the committee reports:
[Tihe bill does not require employers to treat pregnant women in any particular manner
with respect to hiring, permitting them to continue working, providing sick leave, furnish-
ing medical and hospital benefits, providing disability benefits, or any other matter. The
bill would simply require that pregnant women be treated the same as other employees
on the basis of their ability or inability to work.
S. REP. No. 331, supra note 56, at 4 (emphasis added). The House committee report contains
language identical to that quoted above, and in addition states that "H.R. 6075 in no way requires
the institution of any new programs where none currently exist." H.R. RaP. No. 948, supra note 4,
at 4 (emphasis added). See also note 137 supra.




VII. 9 4 The Gilbert Court referred only to subsection (b) of the guide-
lines' 95-requiring parity of disability benefits' 9 6-but the congres-
sional endorsement was broader. Both committees noted that, under
the guidelines, excluding applicants or employees from employment
because of pregnancy is a violation of Title VII. 1'97 The committees
also concluded that these guidelines rightly implemented the Title VII
prohibition of sex discrimination in the 1964 Act. 198
If the committees intended to endorse only subsection (b) of the
guidelines, the intent was well concealed. Also, if Congress intended
section 70 1(k) to supplement the existing bona fide occupational quali-
fication exemption in Title VII, one may question the repeated assur-
ances that the narrow approach adopted by the amendment reflected
"no new legislative mandate"'99 with regard to Title VII's application.
Finally, section 701(k) explicitly restricts the scope of section 703(h),
which allows differentiated pay scales for men and women so long as
the Equal Pay Act is not violated.2"o One may ask, then, why Congress
did not similarly act with respect to section 703(a) if it intended the
amendment to restrict the scope of that section. That Congress could
easily have made such intent explicit, but chose not to, cautions against
inferring that intent.
III. CONCLUSION
Any hope of resolving the dilemma posed by the plain language of
section 701(k) lies in the purpose underlying the amendment: to pro-
hibit "discrimination" based on pregnancy. The question then be-
comes whether an employer who discharges a pregnant employee
because of a policy of little or no sick leave for any disabled em-
ployee-pregnant or not-thereby "discriminates" against the em-
ployee because of her pregnancy.
The EEOC, according to subsection (c) of its pregnancy guidelines,
finds such discrimination if termination under a "no leave" policy "has
a disparate impact on employees of one sex and is not justified by busi-
194. See note 115 supra and accompanying text.
195. See note 52 supra.
196. See note 31 supra.
197. S. REP. No. 331, supra note 56, at 2; H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 4, at 2. The reference
here is most likely to subsection (a) of the pregnancy guidelines. See note 31 supra.
198. S. REP. No. 331, supra note 56, at 2; H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 4, at 2.
199. See notes 129-30 supra and accompanying text.
200. See note 56 supra.
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ness necessity."2 °1 The implications of this guideline, however, are un-
clear since termination because of pregnancy will necessarily have a
disparate impact on the "one sex" which alone can become pregnant.20 2
The guideline thus is tantamount to an absolute prohibition by the
EEOC against an employer discharging an employee because of preg-
nancy, regardless of whether a similarly disabled, but nonpregnant,
employee would be treated the same.
The validity of this prohibition depends, ultimately, on the courts'
interpretation of section 701(k) and its relation to section 703(a)(1).
Congress clearly intended section 701(k) to require equality of treat-
ment among employees based on their ability or inability to work, not
on their being pregnant or nonpregnant.203 It remains for the courts to
determine-in the face of the ambiguous legislative history and im-
provident drafting of the 1978 amendment-whether Congress also in-
tended to ratify or preclude the EEOC's stance, or whether, indeed, the
thought never crossed its collective mind.
Stephen D. Coffin
201. See text accompanying note 180 supra. On its face, this subsection seems to apply to
discharge of an employee temporarily disabled by auiy cause, not simply pregnancy. The inclu-
sion of this guideline, however, in the section entitled "Employment policies relating to pregnancy
imd childbirth," 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1979), indicates that the EEOC's concern lay especially with
disability caused by pregnancy and childbirth.
202. One may question what constitutes "disparate impact" in this context. As one commen-
tator has articulated the problem: "By definition, any distinction involving pregnancy will have
an impact only on women. Hence, does 'disparate' refer to the number of women affected or to
something else?" Barkett, supra note 3, at 419 n.71. In light of the EEOC's long standing position
that, absent business necessity, an employer cannot discharge an employee solely on the basis of
pregnancy, see notes 176-80 supra and accompanying text, the number of women affected by
termination under a "no leave" policy seems irrelevant; discharge because of pregnancy, on this
view, is unlawful under Title VII regardless. Further indication that this is the EEOC's view lies
in its finding of disparate impact when a policy or practice has "a significantly disproportionate
adverse effect. . . upon the employment opportunities of a class protected by Title VII." EEOC
COMPL. MAN. (CCH) f 3192 (emphasis added). With regard to pregnancy related policies, the
EEOC clearly considers the protected "class" to be that of women generally. In discussing the
"underlying premise" in section 703 impact cases, the Compliance Manual states: "If there is not
a socio-economic explanation for the differential impact, then there should be a biological one-
e.g., the impact of a policy forbidding maternity leaves results from the fact that only females get
pregnant; . I..." ld. Thus, according to the EEOC, it is the fact that pregnancy is sex specific,
not the number of women affected by an employment policy, that is central to a finding of dispa-
rate impact.
203. See notes 134-40 supra and accompanying text.
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